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Is Functional Separation BT-Style the Answer? 
Jason WHALLEY & Peter CURWEN 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
Abstract: This paper focuses on functional separation. After recounting the circumstances 
that culminated in the imposition of functional separation within the UK, the paper 
highlights the difficulties that have been encountered subsequent to the creation of 
Openreach. Functional separation developments outside the UK are then described and  
doubts raised as to whether the Openreach model is appropriate for other markets.  
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s regulators have sought to resolve the tensions that exist between 
incumbent operators and those services providers that require access 
to their networks, functional separation has emerged as one way to 
achieve the sought-after resolution. Since its adoption in the UK, a range of 
countries have examined the feasibility of adopting functional separation 
within their own markets. Some of these countries have broadly followed the 
UK's lead whereas others have not. 
Any discussion as to whether functional separation UK-style should be 
adopted inevitably raises two questions: what is meant by functional 
separation and what has been the UK experience? A useful starting point to 
answer the first question is XAVIER & YPSILANTI (2004) which identifes six 
different separation alternatives that range from accounting and functional 
separation on the one hand to dividing the incumbent into several smaller 
versions of itself on the other. 1 Of particular relevance here are the four 
different models of structural separation – LoopCo, NetCo, alternative 
distribution companies and voluntary separation – that they propose and 
discuss (XAVIER & YPSILANTI, 2004: 78-91). At the heart of the LoopCo 
1 The six alternatives identified by XAVIER & YPSILANTI (2004: 76) are 1) accounting, 
functional and corporate separation; 2) separation into regional operators; 3) separation of local 
from long distance services; 4) separation of local and mobile services; 5) separation of local 
and broadband/advanced services; and 6) separation of an incumbent into smaller vertically 
integrated operators. 
A
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proposal is the divestment of the local network by the incumbent, whereas in 
contrast the NetCo option would see all of the incumbent's network being 
transferred into a new company.  
The pros and cons of both the LoopCo and NetCo proposals have been 
variously discussed, 2 with it being argued that the latter does not 
satisfactorily address the problems that emerge from the integration of the 
network within a single company. With respect to the restructuring of BT 
announced in late 2000, SANDBACH (2001: 200) argued that the proposed 
NetCo did not satisfactorily address the local loop issue because the 
company would envelop both the copper and switched network. In other 
words, there would still be an incentive for it to favour its own services or 
those provided by other parts of BT.  
Given the problems and uncertainties associated with both the LoopCo 
and NetCo proposals, it is no surprise that recent attention has focused 
elsewhere to resolve the tension between wholesale and retail markets. 
CAVE (2006), for example, identifies six alternatives encompassing 
accounting and structural separation, 3 and notes that the former was more 
or less the modus operandi of incumbent European operators at the time of 
writing. BT, through the creation of Openreach, was the exception. In the 
terms of the six alternatives identified by Cave, Openreach falls under 
'business separation with local incentives' and is thus slightly closer to the 
ownership separation end of the spectrum than the accounting end.  
Openreach is an example of functional separation. This involves the 
selective separation of those parts of the network that are difficult for other 
operators to replicate but which they need access to in order to provide their 
own services (European Regulators Group, 2007: 2). This is frequently 
interpreted as the separation of the incumbent's wholesale and retail 
businesses from one another, although if the focus is solely on those parts of 
the incumbent's network that cannot be replicated then the scope of 
functional separation may be narrower than is implied by the separation of 
wholesale from retail (European Regulators Group, 2007: 8). Regardless of 
the extent to which functional separation occurs, it results in one part of the 
incumbent's network being run and managed separately from the rest. A key 
2 See also, for example, CAVE (2002). 
3 The six alternatives identified by CAVE (2006: 94) are 1) creation of a wholesale division; 2) 
virtual separation; 3) business separation 4) business separation with localised incentives; 5) 
business separation with separate governance arrangements; and, 6) legal separation 
(separate legal entities under the same ownership). 
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component of such an arrangement is that the separated part of the 
company is provided with local incentives that encourage it to act in the 
interests of all its customers, both internal and external, and not in the 
interests of its parent company.  
Within the European Union, Commissioner Reding has commented 
favourably on Openreach (BUCK, 2007; REDING, 2007). In a speech to the 
European Regulators Group, Reding asserted that functional separation 
"should be added to the remedies tool box of national telecom regulators, to 
be available for the stubborn cases where other remedies have been tried, 
but have failed to deliver the desired regulatory outcome" (REDING, 2007: 
3). The same speech also argued that the adoption of functional separation 
in the UK had contributed to the rapid rise in unbundled lines and the 
intensification of investment in the network (REDING, 2007: 4). At the same 
time, the share price of BT had also risen.  
Given the alleged benefits associated with functional separation, the 
remainder of this paper focuses on its implementation, and in so doing it 
does not address its wider impact on issues such as the quality of services 
delivered and the willingness of the separated operator to make subsequent 
infrastructure investments. The following main section is contextual in 
nature, and offers a brief overview of the strategic review of 
telecommunications and the undertakings made by BT. The second main 
section focuses on the implementation of the undertakings, and in so doing it 
addresss the second of the questions noted above. The third main section 
details developmets in other countries, with the main issues noted there 
being discussed in section five. Conclusions are drawn in the final secton of 
the paper.  
?  Context 
Before providing a brief overview of the events that culminated in the 
establishment of Openreach in late 2005, it is necessary to place the 
decision to initiate the Strategic Review of Telecommunication at the 
confluence of three sets of developments. The first of these developments 
was the recent incorporation of EU directives into the UK regulatory system, 
while the second was the relatively recent establishment of OFCOM in 2003. 
The strategic review can thus be viewed as drawing a line under the old 
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regulatory framework and as providing a mechanism through which a new 
approach to regulation could proceed.  
The review could also be regarded as being a reponse to a third set of 
drivers, namely, the failure of competition to develop as anticipated in the 
UK. Although some companies had invested in their own infrastructure, 
these networks lacked scale (OFCOM, 2004a: 53). The cable operators, 
which operated the most extensive networks geographically, collectively 
covered less than half of the population and their ability to compete was 
limited by their continued financial woes. 4 Service based competition had 
been possible since the late-1990s (OFCOM, 2004c: 53) but had enjoyed 
only limited success because, it was alleged, BT had abused its dominant 
position in the wholesale market to enhance its retail competitiveness 
(WILSDON & JONES, 2002).  
The results of such anti-competitive behaiour can be seen with respect to 
broadband and local loop unbundling. Although many companies expressed 
an interest at the end of the 1990s to offer broadband services, most 
subsequently left the market (TURNER, 2003: 6). One consequence of this 
was that only a handful of companies emerged to compete against BT, 
whilst another was the limited uptake of local loop unbundling in the UK. 5
With this in mind, the strategic review could also be viewed as being driven 
by the desire to enhance competition within the broadband 
telecommunications market and to encourage greater adoption of local loop 
unbundling. 
Strategic review of telecommunications 
At the end of 2003 OFCOM announced its intention to hold a review of 
the telecommunications market during the following year (OFCOM, 2004a). 
The initial consultation document was wide-ranging in nature, raising issues 
that were subsequently clarified in the second consultation document 
(OFCOM, 2004b). Central to the second consultation document was the 
4 In 2004 just 46% of UK homes were passed by broadband enabled cable (OFCOM, 2004c: 
38). Subsequent communication market reviews have shown that in 2005 and 2006 digital cable 
was available to 45% of the UK population (OFCOM, 2007a: 15). For a discussion of the 
financial woes of cable operators see, for example, CURWEN (2004). 
5 See, for example, de BIJL & PEITZ (2005) for a discussion of unbundling that highlights the 
relatively slow uptake of local loop unbundling in the UK compared to other European Union 
member states. 
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idntification of three regulatory options, the first of which was deregulation. 
OFCOM concluded, however, that this was not possible, not least because 
sector-specific regulation was faster and more precise than the alternatives. 
The second option was a reference under the Enterprise Act 2002 to the 
Competition Commission. Such a reference would inevitably necessitate a 
wide-ranging review of the telecommunications market that could result in 
the eventual imposition of structural remedies. 6 The third option, the one 
prefered by OFCOM, was termed 'real equality of access' and would enable 
those companies purchasing wholesale products from BT to do so on the 
same terms as BT's own retail operations. Thus, wholesale customers would 
have access to: 
- the same or a similar set of regulated wholesale products as BT's own 
retail activities; 
- at the same prices as BT's own retail activities; and, 
- using the same or similar transactional processes as BT's own retail 
activities (OFCOM, 2004c: 14). 
Two different types of equivalence were proposed – outcome and input – 
and a range of products identified where it could be applied (OFCOM, 
2004b: 68). In the case of equivalence of outcome, wholesale customers 
receive products that are comparable to those offered to BT's own retail 
operations but the underlying processes would not be the same. In contrast, 
where equivalence of input is applied, wholesale customers receive the 
same products as BT's own retail operations using the same set of 
underlying processes (OFCOM, 2004c: 67f).  
Recognising that a range of issues had been identified by many of BT's 
wholesale customers during the consultative process which these customers  
believed placed them at a competitive disadvantage relative to BT (OFCOM, 
2004c: 70), there was also a behavioural dimension to equivalence. While 
the range of issues highlighted was broad, two areas in particular – the 
incentives for inappropriate behaviour and transparency – were singled out 
as areas where action could be taken (OFCOM, 2004c: 70f). Having said 
this, OFCOM did note that BT had, in the past, devoted considerable effort 
and resources to addressing the complaints raised by its competitors.  
6 Any reference under the Enterprise Act 2002 would also be protracted, taking several years to 
run its course. 
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Undertakings in lieu of reference under the Enterprise Act 2002 
In June 2005, OFCOM announced that it was launching a consultation to 
determine whether it should accept the undertakings offered by BT to bring 
an end to the strategic review (OFCOM, 2005a). Rather than trigger a 
reference under the Enterprise Act 2002, BT agreed to a series of legally 
enforceable undertakings (OFCOM, 2005a: 2). BT agreed to create an 
access service division that would:  
- control the 'last mile' of the telecommunications network; 
- be operationally independent of BT while remaining under the 
ownership of BT; 
- be branded differently from BT; 
- have its own five-member board, headed by a non-executive director 
of BT; and, 
- incorporate 15,000 out of BT Wholesale's 28,000 employees (Odell, 
2005: 23). 
In addition, BT also agreed to a schedule for equivalence for legacy 
products as well as stating the principles on which the company's next 
generation network (NGN) would be developed (OFCOM, 2005a: 2ff). For its 
part, OFCOM stated that it would revisit issues such as leased lines and 
retail price controls in the near future (OFCOM, 2005a: 5). 
In September 2005, OFCOM accepted the undertakings offered by BT 
(OFCOM, 2005b). In total, 236 undertakings were made by BT. These 
govern the operation of the access service division to ensure that those 
wholesale customers, which rely on access to deliver their own products and 
services, are treated no differently from BT's own retail operations (OFCOM, 
2005c). At the same time as OFCOM agreed to accept the undertakings, BT 
rebranded its access service division as Openreach (OFCOM, 2005b). 
?  Implementing the undertakings 
Given the magnitude of the undertakings, it is no surprise that their 
implementation is being carefully monitored. To date, OFCOM has published 
two evaluations of the impact of the telecommunications strategic review that 
detail the progress that BT has made in implementing the undertakings. In 
addition, five quarterly reviews were published between October 2005 and 
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February 2007 as well as correspondence between OFCOM, BT and other 
interested parties. 7
A useful starting point in order to understand the implementation of the 
undertakings are the two annual evaluations that have been published by 
OFCOM. The first of these, which was published in October 2006, 
acknowledges the effort that has been placed into meeting the undertakings 
by BT before identifying a range of areas where implementation has been 
less than satisfactory (OFCOM, 2006a). Eight areas where further action 
was required were identified (OFCOM, 2006a: 2). It is perhaps no surprise 
that the eight areas requiring further action are broad in their scope, ranging 
from the need to resolve boundary issues between BT Wholesale and 
Openreach to agreeing how Openreach's management information systems 
(MIS) and operational support systems (OSS) can be separated out from the 
rest of BT. 8
The second annual report suggests that further work is required to 
separate Openreach from the rest of BT and to develop, and subsequently 
deploy, equivalent products (OFCOM, 2007b). In addition, the report also 
states, somewhat vaguely, that more effort is required if the full benefits of 
functional separation are to be achieved (OFCOM, 2007b: 4). The report 
also contains a summary of a survey involving BT's wholesale customers 
conducted by Spectrum Value Partners on behalf of OFCOM. Although the 
respondents acknowledge the challenges of implementing the undertakings 
and the extent to which resources have been directed towards this task, they 
are also critical of BT. According to the feedback, a degree of mistrust 
continues to exist between some wholesale customers and BT. It is also the 
case that while deadlines have been met, this has allegedly been at a cost to 
innovation and service quality (OFCOM, 2007b: 65f). Furthermore, some 
respondents felt that through interacting with both BT Wholesale and 
Openreach they had experienced a 'degradation in treatment' due to their 
business being split between the two and becoming less important to each 
as a consequence.  
Both annual reports highlight the difficulties of separating Openreach 
from the rest of BT, noting in particular the information system-based 
difficulties being encountered. The three information systems in question are 
7 These reports, as well as the other material published by OFCOM relating to the 
telecommunications strategic review and the implementation of the undertakings, can be found 
at www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/btundertakings.  
8 See OFCOM (2006a: 2) for a full list of the eight areas identified that require further action. 
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MIS, OSS and the equivalence management platform (EMP). Openreach is 
required to logically separate its OSS from the rest of BT and to physically 
separate them from one another by June 2010 (OFCOM, 2007b, 48). 
However, OFCOM and BT interpreted logical separation differently with the 
consequence that clarification was required OFCOM (2007d). Although this 
inevitably resulted in some delays, it also produced a clear timetable for the 
migration of users to physically separate systems.  
Additional time was also sought by BT to separate the MIS between 
Openreach and the rest of the company. While OFCOM did agree to this 
request, BT was required to assist users to restrict access and define the 
subsequent separation process. This has largely been achieved although 
OFCOM does note that risks still remain with those systems that draw on 
BT-wide initiatives (OFCOM, 2007a: 48). The delivery of equivalence is 
supported through the use of the EMP, 9 the implementation of which has 
been less than satisfactory since it was first introduced in early 2006. The 
delivery of the initial system was delayed and subsequent versions were 
released with reduced functionality (OTA, 2006a & 2006b). The Office of the 
Telecommunications Adjudicator (OTA), which was established in May 2005 
to oversee the implementation of those processes necessary for other 
operators to access BT's local loop, has published a series of monthly 
updates that highlight the problems that have been experienced in the 
development of these processes. 10
Perhaps more importantly, concerns have been raised as to the stability 
of the EMP (OTA, 2007a) and the extent to which the service is unavailable 
(OTA, 2007b & 2007c). Both of these have caused problems for the 
telecommunications companies using EMP. Although these issues have 
been tackled to varying degrees of success, they have engendered a degree 
of uncertainty regarding the platform's robustness and reliability. 
The correspondence published by OFCOM highlights some of the 
difficulties that have been encountered in the implementation of the 
undertakings. 11 BT has, on more than one occasion, sought more time to 
implement the undertakings. Although OFCOM has invariably granted these 
9 The EMP is an information system that supports the delivery of the products offered by 
Openreach. Given the anticipated large volumes of some of these products, the system is 
designed to be automated to ensure that services are provided as demanded.  
10 The monthly updates can be found at the OTA website, www.offta.org.uk. 
11 See, www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/btundertakings/exemptionsandvariations, for a full list of 
the correspondence between BT and OFCOM that has been published. 
J. WHALLEY & P. CURWEN 153 
requests, it is worth noting that the extensions are temporary and not open-
ended. This correspondence is relatively brief, which is in contrast to the 
consultations surrounding the range of exemptions and variations that BT 
has sought since June 2006.  
To bring the strategic review to a swift conclusion, it was agreed that 
OFCOM and BT could consider at a later date the equivalence of inputs 
needs of some products (OFCOM, 2006e). In June 2006, BT sought 
exemptions and variations in 15 different areas, with 13 requiring 
consultation due to their complexity (OFCOM, 2006f). As a result of this 
consultation, OFCOM agreed to nine of the requests. The remaining four 
requests required additional consultation as they involved products relying 
on fibre (OFCOM, 2006e).  
In turn, this additional consultation resulted in three out of the four 
requests being granted. OFCOM granted a temporary extension until 
December 2007 in the case of the fourth request while further consultation 
was undertaken (OFCOM, 2007e: 2). More exemptions were published in 
October 2007, and were the outcome of a consultation process that began in 
July of the same year (OFCOM, 2007f). The most recent variation was 
granted in May 2008. The granted variations are shown below in Table I 
(below). 12
The published correspondence, as well as the exemptions and variations 
consultations published by OFCOM, draw attention to boundary issues. 
Boundary issues arise where the distinction between Openreach and the 
rest of BT is blurred. One area where boundary issues have arisen was 
noted above, namely to ensure that the information systems that linked 
Openreach with the rest of BT were altered so that the two were separate 
from one another.  
A second area where boundary issues have emerged is that of access to 
engineering resources. BT has sought to move engineers between 
Openreach and BT Wholesale as circumstances dictate (OFCOM, 2006b: 
3). For example, BT requested permission from OFCOM to move engineers 
between the two divisions in the aftermath of the floods that swept the south 
of England during 2007. This was, however, a temporary measure that 
addressed a particular series of events.   
12 There is currently an ongoing consultation, OFCOM (2008a), which would further increase 
the number of granted variations.  
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Table 1 – Variations to the undertakings 
Variation Scope  Date 
1 Products & services supplied by Access Services (Openreach); 
share schemes and BT Group Deferred Bonus Plan; EAB report to 
OFCOM; EAB Summary Annual Report 
Mar 2006 
2 Equipment location  Apr 2006 
3 Products & services supplied by Access Services (Openreach) Aug 2006 
4 OSS separation Sept 2006 
5 OSS separation Oct 2006 
6 Products & services supplied by Access Services (Openreach) Dec 2006 
7 Information flows & system separation Dec 2006 
8 Products & services supplied by Access Services (Openreach) Apr 2007 
9 OSS separation Jun 2007 
10 Incident management processes Oct 2007 
11 Extensions to OSS and EOI timetables Nov 2007 
12 Changes to sections 2.1 (definitions), 5 (access services) and 6 
(management & structure of BT Wholesale) 
Dec 2007 
13 Products & services supplied by Access Services (Openreach) Dec 2007 
14 Provision of equivalent products and services – changes to section 
3.1.1, section 3.1.2 and annex 1 of the undertakings 
Dec 2007 
15 Products & services supplied by Access Services, changes to 
section 5.46.2 
May 2008 
Source: www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/btundertakings/exemptionsandvariations,  
accessed 7 June 2008 
The quarterly reports published by OFCOM draw attention to the need to 
ensure that the 'Chinese Walls' between Openreach and the rest of BT are 
maintained (OFCOM, 2006b & 2006d). A separate Openreach head office 
has been established, and some of the earlier concerns that the 'Chinese 
Walls' were unsatisfactory due to organisational changes within BT 
Wholesale have been addressed. 13 The second report on the 
implementation of the undertakings notes that Openreach is reliant on other 
parts of BT for access to space and power within exchanges (OFCOM, 
2007b: 46f). As a consequence of this it was felt that Openreach does not 
have adequate control over the products that it delivers. 
Also highlighted by the quarterly reports are the concerns expressed by 
other telecommunication operators as well as by OFCOM regarding product 
development. The former have noted that a gap existed early on between 
what BT announced and what was delivered (OFCOM, 2006b: 11), while 
13 BT Wholesale has been reorganized with two management units – BT Wholesale Core 
Network Services and BT Wholesale Value-added Network Services – being established 
(OFCOM, 2006b: 5). The concern expressed by some telecommunications operators was that 
this would complicate the implementation of the ‘Chinese Walls’ that were established. 
However, OFCOM stated that more time should be given before making a judgement as to 
whether the ‘Chinese Walls’ were being breached. 
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more recently their interaction with BT has become an issue (OFCOM, 
2006c: 9f; OFCOM, 2006d: 10). It was alleged that this interaction was 
insufficient, and that in some cases the ability of other telecommunication 
operators to influence product specifications was limited. To this, OFCOM 
(2007b) adds that the pace of product development has been slow before 
acknowledging that this may be due to developments elsewhere in BT. 14
Since the undertakings were agreed, the number of unbundled lines has 
increased from 123,000 in September 2005 to 4.76 million in June 2008 
(OTA, 2005 & 2008). However, both of the undertaking evaluation reports 
published by OFCOM show that key performance indicator targets have 
been missed (OFCOM, 2006: 20; 2007b: 58ff) and that the performance of 
some indicators has been volatile. That said, there has been a general 
improvement in some indicators like 'first touch–last touch right first time' for 
LLU. These improvements naturally benefit those companies relying on the 
processes to deliver their own services.  
Although the prices for LLU were settled before the undertakings were 
finalised, with a charge ceiling of £81.69 being agreed, 15 a recent 
consultation issued by OFCOM has reopened the issue. As Openreach has 
failed to achieve the 10 per cent return that is permitted, BT would like to 
raise the charge ceilings (PARKER, 2008b: 18). 16 Unsurprisingly, those 
companies that use BT's local network to deliver their own services have 
objected, with Carphone Warehouse stating that it would be unfair to 
'change the game' (PARKER, 2008a: 19). The implications of the 
consultation are clear: if the charge ceilings are raised, the cost to other 
service providers of using Openreach's products will also increase.  
14 Two developments are noted, namely, the implementation of the undertakings as well as the 
development of the company’s 21st century network. 
15 See, for example, WHALLEY & CURWEN (2008: 286f) for more details of the setting of LLU 
prices in 2004. Whilst it is arguably the case that the decline in prices, which occurred before 
both the OTA and Openreach were established, contributed to the subsequent growth in the 
number of unbundled local loops, the precise extent to which they did so is hard to determine. 
16 One factor contributing to the failure of Openreach to achieve its permitted rate of return has 
been the move away from the use of wholesale line rental by other communication providers 
(OFCOM, 2008b: 18). 
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?  Developments in other countries 
As it is often claimed that Openreach offers a model that other countries 
could adopt, it is useful to briefly recount developments elsewhere. The first 
sub-section below recounts developments within other EU countries while 
the second sub-section focuses on countries further afield. 
EU countries 
The Italian case is particularly interesting because of the explicit role 
played by the government. Initially, Telecom Italia was prepared to introduce 
functional separation on a voluntary basis. However, when a controlling 
stake was put on the market by Pirelli, it became apparent that it might be 
acquired by a foreign-owned operator such as AT&T and the government 
became alarmed at the prospect of Telecom Italia's core network falling 
under foreign control. In April 2007, the government accordingly tabled a 
proposal that would bolster the powers of the regulator, AGCOM so as to 
permit it to ring-fence all of the local loop connections plus 'all the elements 
necessary to provide broadband access'. If it cannot reach agreement with 
Telecom Italia over the details of functional separation, the new powers will 
enable it to impose its own variant of this remedy. The government inserted 
the new rules into an existing bill on liberalization with a view to their speedy 
enactment although, in the event, its attitude caused AT&T to withdraw and 
an Italian dominated consortium became the preferred bidders (CLARK & 
ZAMPANO, 2007; ZAMPANO, 2007).  
In February 2008 Telecom Italia announced that it would create a new 
unit to manage its fixed-line network. The new unit, Open Access, would be 
completely autonomous and separate from its other commercial operations 
and would ensure that its external and internal customers would be treated 
equally. It would form part of a large division, Technology and Operations. 
However, a critical point is that Open Access would be structurally different 
from Openreach in that, unlike the latter, it would not have a separate, 
independent board (Global Insight, 2008a). More recently, Telecom Italia 
has unveiled proposals that include an assurance that all competitors will 
receive equal treatment; easier access to information regarding the quality 
and the development of the access network; and a new process of activation 
for wholesale customer services. A new unit will also be created to ensure 
adherence to these promises (PriMetrica, 2008).  
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In early March 2007, the Netherlands regulator, OPTA, gave 
consideration to a report on the applicability of Openreach to the 
Netherlands market prepared by consultants NERA (NERA, 2007). The 
report concluded that the circumstances in the Netherlands were sufficiently 
different from those in the UK in that cable operators provided a satisfactory 
alternative infrastructure such as to render any form of separation 
unnecessary. In addition, unlike in the UK where a reference to the 
Competition Commission could ultimately lead to structural separation, the 
regulatory system provided no mechanism to provide a realistic threat of 
such an outcome. NERA added that since KPN intended to upgrade both its 
core and access networks – unlike BT which intended to upgrade only its 
core network – there was a danger that functional separation would 
discourage KPN from investing in a Next Generation Network (GLOBAL 
INSIGHT, 2007a). Shortly thereafter, the OPTA Chairman effectively ruled 
out any attempt to introduce functional separation (SCHIFFERS, 2007). 
The Polish regulator, UKE, also favours functional separation despite 
strong opposition from incumbent TPSA (HALABA, 2007). However, the 
legal position appears to be a matter of contention for now between the UKE 
and the government (Global Insight, 2008b).  
In March 2007, under pressure from the government, Portugal Telecom 
made a commitment to separate ownership of its fixed-wire and cable 
networks and to spin-off PT Multimedia, its cable TV and media content 
division, before the end of 2007 (WISE, 2007). It may well be that such 
voluntary compliance will stand it in good stead should the issue of 
functional separation appear on the regulatory agenda. 
In February 2007, the head of broadband services at TeliaSonera stated 
that, in the light of a report by the regulator, PTS, to the government 
recommending functional separation along the lines of Openreach, it would 
be prepared to work towards a mutual solution along those lines 
(HANSSON, 2007a). However, talks between the parties broke down in 
March when TeliaSonera rejected the possibility of a forced rather than a 
voluntary separation (HANSSON, 2007b). In mid-June, the Swedish 
regulator formally proposed that TeliaSonera should be forced to undertake 
functional separation of its fixed-wire network but saw no need for structural 
separation. However, as it was also proposed that this should be enshrined 
in new legislation, it could not be brought about before 2009. TeliaSonera 
rejected the proposal, claiming that voluntary arrangements would be 
preferable. A consultation process was set in progress (ANDERSON, 2007) 
but TeliaSonera pre-empted this by accepting functional separation in 
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September with its implementation set for the year-end (Global Insight, 
2007b; HANSSON, 2007c).   
Elsewhere 
In New Zealand, a decision was taken by the government in 2004 to deny 
access to the local loop network owned by Telecom New Zealand (TNZ). 
However, in May 2006, the Minister for Communications suddenly reversed 
this decision, adding that the government would 'look at whether additional 
measures are warranted, such as the structural separation of TNZ's retail 
and lines operations' (MOLDOFSKY, 2006). In June, TNZ announced that it 
intended voluntarily to create a separate, independent wholesale operation 
which it claimed was 'the best form of separation to suit New Zealand 
conditions' (DigitalMediaAsia, 2007).  
In November, a government select committee recommended that TNZ 
divide its operations into separate units for fixed-wire, retail and wholesale 
networks, a much more radical proposal than the accounting separation 
between its retail and wholesale units proposed by TNZ. TNZ responded 
surprisingly favourably, agreeing that it would not oppose its implementation 
(TeleGeography, 2006), presumably on the grounds that functional 
separation was much preferable to structural separation. In any event, since 
it had already separated operationally its retail and wholesale units in June, 
the remedy was already part-implemented. After lengthy consultations, the 
government in April 2007 reiterated its intention to impose a three-way 
functional split (TeleGeography, 2007a).  
To general surprise, TNZ then offered to sell its fixed-wire network in 
exchange for more lenient regulation of its retail and wholesale operations. 
Although it was unprecedented for an operator to opt for structural 
separation in preference to operational separation, TNZ argued that the 
latter would be too complex, costly and unworkable within the imposed 2010 
deadline, and it possibly feared that structural separation would anyway be 
imposed at a later date (PANNETT, 2007). In September, the government 
announced that it intended to implement the three-way functional division 
before end-March 2008 at a cost of $148 million over a four-year period and 
that an independent oversight body would be created, presumably following 
the Openreach model (TeleGeography, 2007b). In early October, TNZ's new 
CEO announced that TNZ no longer wanted to sell its network division 
(TeleGeography, 2007c) and in late October it submited a draft separtion 
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plan (ROSS, 2007a). One month later it submitted its final plan with a 
specified 'separation day' of 31 March 2008 with the Openreach equivalent 
to be named 'Chorus' (ROSS, 2007b). In February 2008, the government 
demanded that a revised plan be submitted and this was duly accepted on 
31 March (TelecomWeb, 2008). 
?  Discussion 
Through focusing on functional separation in the UK and elsewhere, it is 
possible to make a series of observations regarding its implementation to 
date. The first observation that can be made is that separating Openreach 
from the rest of BT is not straightforward. The access service division 
required by the undertakings was swiftly transformed into Openreach, with 
its own brand, board and incentive schemes. In contrast, separating 
Openreach from the rest of BT in terms of processes and products has not 
been swiftly achieved. The separation has proved to be complex and, if the 
requests for extensions are anything to go by, more protracted than 
anticipated.  
As BT has struggled to separate Openreach from the rest of the 
company, so other telecommunications providers have complained. These 
complaints reflect the fact that they rely, in some shape or form, on the 
products provided by Openreach. Delays in providing these products, or in 
their unreliable provision, place other telecommunication providers at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis BT.  
A second observation is that as the undertakings have been gradually 
implemented, difficulties have been encountered. These have prompted BT 
to ask for exemptions and variations to the undertakings. OFCOM has 
scrutinised the need for variations, consulting as appropriate, and granted 15 
variations to the undertakings to date. Some commentators have questioned 
the cumulative impact of the variations, exemptions and extensions that 
OFCOM has granted. It is argued although each has been scrutinised on an 
individual basis, no account has been taken of their combined impact on the 
implementation of the undertakings and hence on other telecommunication 
operators. As it is unclear how the various exemptions, extensions and 
variations interact with one another, it is possible that some customers may 
be treated differently due, for example, to the characteristics of the products 
that they purchase from Openreach. If so, then one of the rationales for 
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functional separation, namely that customers are not treated differently, will 
be undermined.   
The European Commission has described Openreach in favourable 
terms. This has not, however, led (so far) to the model being widely adopted 
throughout the EU. Although Sweden has opted to follow the Openreach 
model, the Dutch regulator has decided not to introduce functional 
separation given the different market conditions that prevail particularly in 
terms of the strong inter-platform competition that exists in the Dutch 
telecommunications market. Although some member states are opposed in 
principle, many national regulators endorsed the European Regulators 
Group stance on functional separation without necessarily committing to its 
introduction in their own jurisdictions. In other words, there is a view in some 
member states that functional separation is unnecessary given their 
particular market characteristics. 
Between these two extremes are to be found developments within Italy 
and New Zealand. Telecom Italia has established Open Access which, 
significantly, will not be overseen by an independent board like Openreach in 
the UK. In other words, Open Access shares some of the characteristics of 
Openreach that presumably made Openreach an attractive model for the 
European Commission. Likewise, developments in New Zealand do not 
replicate exactly the events that culminated in the creation of Openreach. 
Unlike BT, which sought to retain its fixed-line network, TNZ voluntarily 
opted to implement structural over functional separation. This offer was, 
however, not accepted with the consequence that functional separation was 
adopted in September 2007. Interestingly the version of functional 
separation adopted in New Zealand was broader than that implemented in 
the UK. Thus, a third observation is that there are several identifiable 
functional separation models that are shaped by local circumstances. 
?  Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that the implementation of functional 
separation in the UK to date has not been without its problems. The 
unravelling of the numerous relationships that bound Openreach with the 
rest of BT has been complicated, probably more so than anticipated when 
the undertakings were agreed in late 2005. As the relationships have been 
unwound, BT has asked for exemptions and variations from the 
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undertakings as well as for more time. If nothing else, the difficulties that 
have been encountered should be sufficient for any government/regulator 
that is considering the replication of the UK approach to functional 
separation to think twice. 
That only a handful of countries have followed the UK model even in 
broad principle suggests that there are limitations to adopting functional 
separation BT-style. The strategic review and the undertakings that resulted 
were initiated by a peculiarly British set of circumstances. The forms of 
functional separation adopted in Italy and New Zealand reflect local 
circumstances, with the former demonstrating the limitations of the model 
within Europe where the regulatory framework is supposedly the same as 
the UK. Thus, whilst functional separation may be attractive to regulators 
they are likely to adopt it in a form that takes into account the vagaries of the 
local market. In other words, functional separation may be the answer but 
not in the precise form implemented within the UK. 
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